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Abstract  
This paper studies the impact of increased price information on the functioning 
of the housing market. We first study the implications of new information for 
market outcomes in a theoretical framework so as to disentangle the potential 
channels through which information may be important. The results suggest that 
increased information leads to higher prices. The time on the market, in turn, 
may become longer or shorter depending on which side of the market reacts more 
to the new information. In the empirical part of the paper, we utilize a Finnish 
policy intervention to estimate these effects. In July 2007, a website with detailed 
information about individual housing transactions was opened. The website 
covered only part of the country, which allows us to use the Differences-in-
Differences method to estimate the effect of increased information. The results 
show that increased information on past transactions led to higher prices and 
shorter times on the market. In the light of our theoretical results, the empirical 
evidence therefore indicates that buyers react more to the new information than 
the sellers. 
Key words: Housing prices, time on the market, information, learning, 
differences-in-differences 
JEL classification numbers: R30, D83 
 
Tiivistelmä  
Tutkimme asuntojen hintatietojen julkistamisen vaikutuksia asuntomarkkinoiden 
toimintaan. Tutkimuksen ensimmäisessä osassa tarkastelemme yksinkertaisen 
mallikehikon avulla, millä eri tavoilla informaation lisääminen voi vaikuttaa 
asunnon ostajien ja myyjien käyttäytymiseen. Simulaatiotulosten perusteella 
voidaan odottaa, että yksityiskohtaisen hintatiedon julkistaminen nostaa 
asuntojen hintatasoa. Sen sijaan vaikutus asuntojen myyntiaikoihin riippuu siitä, 
reagoivatko ostajat vai myyjät enemmän uuteen informaatioon. Tutkimuksen 
toisessa osassa hyödynnämme suomalaista uudistusta hintainformaation hinta- ja 
myyntiaikavaikutusten estimoimiseen. Heinäkuussa 2007 ympäristöministeriö 
avasi nettipalvelun, jossa julkaistaan asuntojen hintatietoja. Palvelu kattaa vain 
tietyt kunnat, mikä tarjoaa hyvän mahdollisuuden palvelun vaikutusten 
arvioimiseen. Empiiriset tuloksemme näyttävät, että lisääntynyt informaatio 
aikaisemmista asuntokaupoista nosti asuntojen hintatasoa ja lyhensi myyntiaikoja 
palveluun kuuluneilla alueilla. 
Asiasanat: Asuntojen hinnat, myyntiaika, informaatio, oppiminen 
JEL-luokittelu: R30, D83 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the importance of information structures on market outcomes has 
been increasingly recognized in the economics literature. One much discussed 
issue is related to the role of information in explaining price dispersion of 
identical products.1 Another important research agenda relates to the value of 
information in decentralized trading where traders can learn from own 
experience. If information is valuable to the traders and determines the gains 
from trade, the distribution of information becomes an important policy issue.  
Housing markets provide an interesting setting for studying the effect of 
information shocks. Because houses are spatially fixed and heterogeneous, there 
is no single market price for a housing unit. In contrast, the price of a house is 
determined in a bidding process between a seller and a buyer. One important 
determinant of this process is the outside option of the trading partners: What 
price would the seller expect to obtain if he does not trade with the current 
partner? How expensive does the buyer believe other similar houses on the 
market to be? The average price level in a city may give little guidance to the 
traders in this respect.   
In this type of setting, more detailed information about past transactions of 
comparable houses is useful for the traders. One would therefore expect that 
revealing such information has important effects on housing market outcomes. 
This paper aims to evaluate these effects.  
To this end, we first study the implications of new price information for market 
outcomes in a theoretical framework in order to disentangle the potential 
channels through which information may be important. This analysis builds on 
previous literature on learning from own experience, in particular, Mason and 
Välimäki (2007, 2011). The crucial elements of the analysis are that increased 
information 1) helps the sellers of houses in formulating beliefs about how much 
the buyers value his house and 2) helps buyers to visit the right house. 2  
In the second part of the paper, we study a Finnish reform which increased 
publicly available price information in the housing market and use the theoretical 
framework to interpret the empirical results. The reform was the following: In 
2007, the Finnish Ministry of Environment opened a website publishing detailed 
information about individual housing transactions. Previously, only aggregate 
data on house prices were publicly available. The website covered only some 
parts of the country. This created a quasi-experimental setting which offers a 
                                              
1 For a general discussion and review of the literature, see e.g. Baye et al. (2006). 
2 Of course, learning could also be related to the quality of the house. See e.g. Taylor (1999) where time 
on the market is an indication of the quality of the house. The reform we wish to analyze, however, does 
not change the market environment in this respect. 
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possibility to obtain reliable estimates for the effects of increased information 
using the Differences-in-Differences (DiD) method.  
We are not aware of any previous empirical papers studying the effect of 
increased price information on the market outcomes in housing markets. 
However, the effect of increased information about the quality of local amenities 
has been addressed in the literature. In this literature, the main question of 
interest relates to capitalization of local amenity values into house prices. For 
instance, Fiva and Kirkebøen (2011) study housing market reactions to the 
publication of information on school quality. If households care about school 
quality and if the publication of school quality provides new information to the 
households, prices are expected to increase in areas with high quality schools and 
vice versa. This is indeed what the authors find at least in the short run. Our 
research agenda is different from these types of analyses in that we wish to 
understand why and how information about the price of one house affects the 
price or sales time of some other house. 
In our study, the identification strategy relies on geographical differences in the 
amount of information available to traders.3 In this sense, our approach is similar 
to some other studies exploiting geographical variation in the amount of 
information. For instance, Jensen (2007) analyzes the price dispersion in a setting 
where fishermen in an Indian state Kerala must choose to land their fish to one of 
several markets without knowing the demand conditions in the different markets. 
He finds that by improving access to market information, the introduction of 
mobile phones improved arbitrage opportunities of the fishermen and resulted in 
reduced price dispersion across geographic markets. Svensson and Yanagizawa 
(2009) in turn study the effect of disseminating agricultural commodity price data 
in major market centers through local FM radio stations in various districts on 
farm-gate prices. They find evidence suggesting that better-informed farmers 
managed to bargain for higher farm-gate prices. In both these studies, increased 
information was clearly directed to one side of the market and the goods traded 
were homogenous. Our housing market experiment is different in that new 
information can be beneficial for both sides of the market. Thus, it is far less 
clear how increased information should affect the market outcomes. In particular, 
the process of selling and buying a house involves finding a trading partner and 
bargaining over the price and this often takes months. Therefore, the effects of 
the reform need not relate to prices alone but can also be reflected in sales times.   
In order to study the effects of the reform, we simulate a model economy and 
compare the market outcomes before and after the reform. Regarding the 
behavior of the sellers, we observe the following: Because learning from own 
experience is asymmetric, not all sellers benefit equally from new information. 
                                              
3 Internet has been the source of increased information in many studies (see, e.g. Brown and Goolsbee, 
2002). 
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To see this, consider first the situation after the reform. After the reform, the 
sellers possess more accurate information about the value of their house. In 
contrast, before the reform, some underestimate while others overestimate the 
value of their house. When entering the market, those who overestimate the value 
of their house, set too high prices. They are therefore more likely to stay long in 
the market and revise their price offers downwards. As a result, they effectively 
end up using market information even before the reform. For these sellers, the 
transaction prices are therefore relatively similar before and after the reform. The 
picture is completely different for those who underestimate the value of their 
house before the reform. Before the reform, they set too low prices, sell quickly 
and exit the market. Of course, quick acceptance reveals information about the 
value of the house. Unfortunately, if the sellers have only one house to sell, they 
have no possibility to use this information. After the reform, these sellers enter 
the market with higher prices which leads to higher price level.  
Our simulation results suggest that increased information may lead to longer or 
shorter time on the market. This is because two opposing effects: First, as 
explained above, prices are higher after the reform. Other things equal, this leads 
to longer time on the market. Second, if the new information allows the buyers to 
visit the right house, the sellers meet, on average, buyers with higher valuations. 
Because of this efficiency gain, the houses sell faster. The overall effect on the 
time on the market depends on which of these two effects dominates.  
In the empirical part of the paper, we study the effects of increased price 
information on house prices and time on the market. The effect on sale price is 
modeled through a standard linear regression model. The effect on sales times is 
estimated using duration models. Our empirical results clearly show that the 
reform increased prices. The results related to the time on the market are less 
conclusive but indicate that the reform led to somewhat faster sales. In the light 
of the simulation results, the empirical evidence therefore indicates that buyers 
react more to the new information than the sellers.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we present the 
reform and institutional details related to the Finnish housing market. In section 
3, we present a modeling framework and simulation results related to different 
scenarios. In section 4, we describe our data and present our empirical strategy 
and results. In section 5, we discuss the results, and section 6 concludes. 
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2. Reform and institutional setting 
Statistics Finland publishes regional house price indices and average prices per 
square meter but, traditionally, sales prices of individual condominiums have not 
been publicly available.4 The situation changed on the 1st of July 2007, when the 
Ministry of Environment opened a website which publishes individual sales 
prices of flats in apartment blocks and terraced houses in 13 biggest Finnish 
cities.5 The website allows the user to search transactions by attributes including 
area (municipality, postcode, street)6, the type of flat (apartment block or terraced 
house) and size of flat (number of rooms and square meters). If three or more 
transactions meet the search criteria, the website returns a list of transactions 
including following information for each transaction: 
• Sales price and price per square meter (debt held by the housing company 
added) 
• Floor design (e.g. 2 rooms, open plan kitchen, bathroom) 
• Floor area (square meters) 
• Agent’s assessment on the quality for internal records not for marketing 
purposes (bad, satisfactory, good) 
• Year of construction 
• The storey of the flat and the number of storeys in the house (e.g. 4/5) 
• Elevator (yes/no) 
• Part of town 
If less than three flats meet the criteria, the user is asked to run a less detailed 
search. The date of sale is not shown but the list is ordered by the date of sale. 
The returned list can also be sorted by other attributes. The data for the website 
are provided by the association of four biggest real estate agent companies 
(Kiinteistömaailma, OP-Kiinteistökeskus, Huoneistokeskus and SKV Kiinteistön-
välitys). 
The website increased substantially the amount of information available for 
trading partners in the cities it covers. We use the municipality of Vantaa as an 
example to give an idea of how the website improved the information available 
                                              
4 Single family detached houses are usually traded as real estate and so individual sales prices are 
available from the land registry, but information requests have to be made one by one and there is no 
centralized platform with information on multiple transactions easily available. 
5 The website is http://asuntojen.hintatiedot.fi/fi_FI/ and translates to houseprice.info.fi. 
6 In 2007, there were 416 municipalities and about 2000 postcodes in Finland. Population was 5.3 million. 
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for trading partners.7 In December 2011, a search on two room flats in block 
houses in Vantaa returned 325 transactions. The search could be narrowed down 
to a smaller area by limiting the search to one of the 37 postcodes in Vantaa or 
even individual street (unless there were less than three matches). In the absence 
of the website, the best information publicly available would have been the 
average price per square meter in block houses in the whole municipality in the 
third quarter of 2011.   
The website has been very popular. According to information provided by the 
Ministry of Environment, in 2008, there were on average about 1750 visits from 
about 1000 ip-addresses per day and the page is loaded roughly 10,000 times a 
day. In our data, there are about 70 transactions per day in the area covered by 
the website. The data cover only sales by the four leading real estate agents but 
their market share is believed to be close to 75 percent. Thus, there were 
approximately 15–20 visits per each house sold in the area covered by the 
website.  
In Finland, most residential properties are sold through a real estate agency. The 
agency is responsible for marketing, viewing and all the paper work related to the 
transaction. Agency fees are typically between 2–4 percent of the sales price. The 
agency mediates offers made by potential buyers to the seller. Typically an offer 
made by the buyer leads to a bargaining process in which the seller makes a 
counter offer and the buyer can respond by accepting, rejecting or making a new 
offer. All offers made by both sides are binding in that they involve a deposit, 
which is lost if the offer is withdrawn. 
A large share of the housing stock is condominium flats in apartment blocks and 
terraced houses. Except for single family houses, the legal structure for home 
ownership is a limited liability housing company. Homeowners own housing 
company shares which give them the possession of a specific apartment. The 
owner can occupy the flat herself or rent it out without restrictions on rent. The 
shares are treated as private property and can be used as collateral for mortgage 
loans.  
                                              
7 Vantaa is a municipality of roughly 200,000 people in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area north of Helsinki. 
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3. Model and simulated scenarios 
3.1 Background 
The data we will be exploiting contain detailed information about houses being 
traded but no information about the households involved in the transactions. 
Therefore, when building the model economy, we abstract entirely from issues 
related to how the characteristics of the households (say, wealth or labor market 
position) searching for a house or selling one affect the sales prices.8  
In the analysis, we will make use of the modeling framework developed by 
Mason and Välimäki (2007, 2011). Translated into a housing market context, 
their model has the following features: Each seller has one house. Initially, the 
sellers do not necessarily know how much the buyers value the different 
attributes of their house.9 Houses are of two types. Each buyer is characterized by 
a certain valuation for each house type. The valuations of the buyers form two 
valuation distributions. The situation we have in mind is one where the reform 
increases the information available to the buyers and thereby enables them to 
choose the houses they visit based on transaction prices. Therefore, for 
simplicity, we assume that before the reform, buyers are randomly allocated to 
the sellers. The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Buyers are short lived and 
accept offers up to their valuation. If the offer is accepted, the seller exits the 
market. If not, he waits for the next buyer and makes a new take-it-or-leave-it 
offer. 10  
Increased price information potentially influences the housing market through 
both sellers and buyers. First, the sellers may have a more accurate understanding 
about the valuation distribution of the buyers they meet. Second, the buyers 
observe the price of the different types of houses. This allows them to compare 
the price levels and their own valuations of the different houses and choose 
sellers accordingly. As a result, the reform may help the buyers to sort to more 
suitable houses.  
                                              
8 Our model does not feature real estate agents. We discuss their role in Section 5. 
9 Merlo and Ortalo-Magné (2004) show that there is considerable variation in listing prices and sellers 
who seem to overestimate the value of their house end up staying longer in the market and revise their 
offers downwards.  
10 We wish to keep the bargaining process as simple as possible. The bargaining process in the housing 
market typically entails a buyer making an offer and both parties making counter offers or rejecting the 
offer. Our simple bargaining setting should be interpreted as the last offer of this process leading to either 
acceptance or rejection.   
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3.2 Model 
3.2.1 Before the reform 
There are two types of houses, 1 and 2, with different characteristics. Each buyer 
is endowed with a valuation, v, for both house types. The valuations are drawn 
from two valuation distributions with densities ( )1f v  and ( )2f v  and cumulative 
distribution functions ( )1F v  and ( )2F v . Since the buyers are randomly allocated 
to the sellers, given any take-it-or-leave-it offer, p , the probability that the offer 
is rejected is ( )1F p  and ( )2F p  for houses of type 1 and 2, respectively.  
Before the reform the market works as in Mason and Välimäki (2007). Each 
seller knows the distributions described above but does not know from which 
distribution the valuations of potential buyers for his house are drawn. We denote 
by q the seller’s subjective probability that his house is of type 1. Therefore, 
given belief q, and a price offer p, the seller expects the offer to be rejected with 
probability 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2, 1F q p qF p q F p= + − . 
The response of the buyer to the offer reveals new information to the seller. 
Obviously, if the offer is accepted, the seller cannot use this information because 
he exits the market. If the offer is rejected, the seller can use the information 
contained in the rejection when setting his new offer. In that case, the next period 
belief of the seller is given by 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 2
                                       .                                                               (1)
1
qF p
q
qF p q F p
′ =
+ −  
It is useful to note that the above equation implies that if ( ) ( )2 1 0F p F p− > , the 
seller becomes more pessimistic about the value of his house over time. 
The value function that describes the decision making problem of the seller when 
his belief is q can be written as 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )max 1 , , '
p
V q F q p p F q p V qβ = − +    (2) 
where β  is the subjective discount factor and 'q  is determined by equation (1).  
The first part of the value function says that the seller expects to sell the house in 
current period with probability ( )1 ,F q p−  with price p. The second part says that 
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the seller expects the offer to be rejected with probability ( ),F q p . In that case, 
the value function depends on his updated belief about the type of the house, 'q .  
In the absence of learning, price offers will always be higher in the dynamic 
game than in a one shot game. This is not surprising as having a possibility to sell 
tomorrow must be good news for the seller. However, it is not clear whether 
price offers are higher or lower with learning than without because the magnitude 
of the learning effect depends on the price offer.11 The reason is as follows: The 
price set by the seller determines how much the seller will learn from rejection or 
acceptance. If the price offer is very low, all buyers accept it. If the offer is very 
high, all buyers reject it. That is, there exist low and high price offers which do 
not reveal any new information to the seller. In contrast, intermediate price offers 
allow the seller to learn from own experience.  
3.2.2 After the reform 
The reform makes public all sales prices. We will analyze the following three 
cases: 1) Both sides of the market use new information. 2) Only sellers use new 
information, and buyers are randomly assigned to sellers as before. 3) Only 
buyers use new information and sellers set prices as before.  
Consider first the buyers. For them, increased information means that they now 
observe the price level of houses of type 1 and the price level of houses of type 2. 
Because they know their own valuation of the two different house types, new 
information can help them visit “the right house”. We assume that the buyers are 
risk neutral and aim to maximize the expected net surplus from trade. Let us 
denote the average price level of type 1 and 2 houses before the reform by 
1
prp and 2
prp  , respectively. Then after the reform, a buyer visits a house of type 1 
if  
1 1 2 2
pr prv p v p− > −      (3) 
and house of type 2 otherwise.  
Consider then the sellers. The reform allows them to obtain detailed information 
about the transaction prices of houses that are similar to their own. This means 
that the sellers are able to use the publicly provided price data to infer the type of 
their house.12 In addition, if the buyers also use the new information in order to 
go and visit the house that gives them higher expected utility, the sellers can no 
longer treat the two distributions of valuations as independent.  
                                              
11 See Mason and Välimäki (2007) for more discussion on this issue. 
12 The assumption of full information after the reform may exaggerate the importance of the reform. We 
discuss the assumption in Section 5.   
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With full information about the type of the house, the sellers no longer learn from 
own experience in the market. The problem of a seller of type i house can be then 
written as 
( )( ) ( )max 1  for 1, 2i i i ipV H p p H p V iβ = − + =    (4) 
where Hi is the cumulative distribution function of the valuations that sellers of 
type i house face. The optimal price offer of the sellers can be written as 
 
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
1 * 1 *
*  for 1, 2
1 *
i i i i
i
i i
H p H p
p i
h p
β
β
− −
= =
−
.  (5) 
If the sellers only use new information, the buyers are randomly allocated to the 
sellers as before the reform and hence ( ) ( )i iH p F p= . 
3.3 Numerical analysis 
In this section, we use the modeling framework to study the effects of an 
information shock on the housing market outcomes. In order to simulate the 
model, we need to pin down numerical values for the parameters of the model. In 
what follows, we first explain how we do that. After that we discuss how the 
reform affects the prices and time on the market in the model and discuss the 
reasons for these effects. 
3.3.1 Calibration 
We assume that half of the houses are of type 1 and half of type 2. Because each 
seller meets one buyer each period, the model period must be relatively short. We 
wish to interpret one period as one week and set the discount factor at 0.998. This 
discount factor implies an annual interest rate of 10%. This figure should be 
interpreted as incorporating costs related to staying in the market.  
We also need to determine the initial distribution of beliefs for the sellers. We 
proceed as follows: We assume that all sellers with a house of type 1 (and type 2) 
have the same initial belief about the type of their house. We will formulate the 
initial distribution of beliefs so that all sellers initially make the same mistake. 
By initial mistake we mean the difference between the true type of the house and 
the state variable of the seller when entering the market. For instance, if initial 
mistake is 0.2 for all sellers, for an owner of type 1 house, q=0.8 and for an 
owner of type 2 house, q=0.2. Hence, the distribution of initial beliefs is such 
that 50% of sellers own a house of type 1 and for them q=0.8 and 50% of sellers 
own a house of type 2 and for them q=0.2. 
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We assume that the buyers’ valuations are normally distributed. We choose 
parameters of the valuation distributions so that condition  ( ) ( )2 1 0F p F p− >  is 
satisfied throughout. When this is the case, equation (1) implies that sellers 
become more pessimistic over time if the house fails to sell.  
We normalize the valuation distributions so that we set the mean valuation of 
type 2 houses at 2 =1μ . We then choose the mean of the distribution for type 1, the 
variance of the distributions, and the initial mistake of the sellers so that the 
model replicates as closely as possible the distribution of the time on the market 
in the data before the reform.13 In doing so, the aim is to minimize the sum of 
squared differences between the observed distribution and the prediction of the 
model. We proceed as follows: First, we determine from the empirical 
distribution the share of all trades for each week. We then determine, for a large 
number of the different parameter combinations, the corresponding distribution 
of times on the market in the model. This requires solving the problem of the 
sellers and simulating the market outcome for each parameter combination. 
Finally, we calculate, separately for each parameter combination, the weekly 
differences between the share of trades in the data and in the model, sum up the 
squared differences and choose the parameter combination which minimizes this 
sum.  
This procedure leads us to choose the following parameter values: The mean of 
the distribution for type 1 houses is 1 1.04μ = . The variance is 2 21 2 0.0011σ σ= = . 
The initial mistake of the sellers is 0.46. 
3.3.2 Housing market before the reform 
In simulating the model we do the following: We first choose a grid for the state 
variable (probability that house is of type 1) and solve for the value function and 
the related policy function. The policy function allows us to pin down, using 
equation (1), evolution for the price offers conditional on not having sold the 
house.14  
After having determined the evolution of the price offers, we simulate the market 
outcome. We first calculate the probability of trade for both types of houses. 
After that we determine the share of sellers that trade in each period. This allows 
us to further determine average price and average time on the market.  
Figure 1 shows the frequency of different selling times in the data and in the 
model before the reform in the benchmark case where the initial mistake is 0.46. 
                                              
13 We target the distribution of time on the market and not prices because the model only features two 
types of houses and therefore the variation in prices cannot replicate the actual variation in prices. In 
addition, the price level in the model cannot be readily compared to that in the data. 
14 When solving for the sellers’ problem, we check that the problem is concave. 
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This means that for owners of type 1 house q=0.54 and for owners of type 2 
house q=0.46.  
The biggest differences between the distributions are related to the first two 
weeks. In the data, the share of houses sold increases rapidly during the first four 
weeks. In the model, in turn, underpriced houses sell well immediately during the 
first week. Therefore, after the first week the share of overpriced houses of all 
houses in the market is relatively high and as a result the number of trades goes 
down. The number of trades increases from the third week onwards as sellers 
revise the price offers downwards.  
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Figure 1. Distribution of time on the market in the data and in the model 
before the reform. 
Figure 2 depicts the corresponding evolution of take-it-or-leave-it price offers 
over time. The figure shows that the offers decrease over time. When the seller is 
more confident that the house is of type 1, the offer is initially higher but the 
price offers converge as the seller becomes more pessimistic over time. Figure 2 
also partly reveals an important feature of the model: ex ante identical sellers will 
end up selling at different prices and will experience different time on the market.  
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Figure 2.  The evolution of take-it-or-leave offers conditional on not having 
sold the house. 
 
3.3.3 Housing market after the reform 
In this section we consider the changes in price level and distribution of selling 
times in the three different cases presented above. First, we consider the 
possibility that only sellers use the new information to make inferences about the 
market conditions. More specifically, we assume that after the reform, the sellers 
entering the market know the type of their house, that is, the initial mistake they 
make is zero. As a second step, we assume that sellers’ behavior is not altered 
after the reform but buyers react to the new information. In this case, the 
distribution of the valuations of the two house types changes because the buyers 
visit the house which gives them higher utility in expected terms. The initial 
mistake of the sellers is the same as before the reform but the sellers take into 
account that the buyers’ behavior has changed. Finally, as a third alternative, we 
consider the situation where both sellers and buyers react to the new information 
in the manner discussed above.  
Table 1 shows the predicted changes in the price level as well as time on the 
market before and after the reform in the different cases.  
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Table 1.  Predicted changes in average price level and time on the market 
in different scenarios. 
Change in 
price level, % Before After
Sellers learn 1 7,8 9,3
Buyers learn 1,3 7,8 6,7
Both learn 2 7,8 7,9
Time on the market, weeks
 
 
The table shows that average price increases in all cases. There are two distinct 
rationales for this. First, learning by the sellers before the reform is asymmetric. 
Because each seller has only one house, the possibility of using own experience 
for learning about the value of the house is limited to the case where the house 
does not sell. After a rejection, the seller always has the possibility to revise his 
offer. After an accepted offer, he can no longer revise his offer although he now 
has more information about the market situation. To see this, consider first the 
situation after the reform. After the reform, the sellers possess accurate 
information about the value of their house and take this into account when 
choosing prices. On average, those with better houses sell at higher prices. In 
contrast, before the reform, some underestimate while others overestimate the 
value of their house. When entering the market, those who overestimate the value 
of their house, set too high prices. They are therefore more likely to stay long in 
the market and revise the price offer downwards. As a result, they effectively end 
up using market information even before the reform. For these sellers, the 
transaction prices are therefore relatively similar before and after the reform. 
Those who underestimate the value of their house before the reform sell quickly 
and exit the market without much opportunity to use market information. After 
the reform, these sellers enter the market with higher prices which leads to higher 
price level.  
The second reason for the increase in price is more efficient functioning of the 
market. This happens when the buyers use new information in order to infer 
which house type to visit. Even if the sellers’ initial mistake does not change, the 
sellers take into account that they face, on average, buyers with higher 
valuations. As a result, they set higher prices than before the reform. Because of 
sorting, for any given price level, the offers tend to be accepted more quickly and 
therefore also the transaction prices are slightly higher.15 
On average, houses may stay longer or shorter in the market depending on which 
side of the market uses the new information. First, if only sellers react to new 
                                              
15 The average price increases slightly also when the sellers do not realize that the buyers’ behavior has 
changed after the reform. In that case, time on the market drops even more.  
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information the average price offers are higher but the valuations of the buyers 
the sellers meet are on average similar to those before the reform. These two 
things together imply that average time on the market must go up. Second, if 
only buyers react to new information, we observe a reduction in average time on 
the market. This is because of more efficient matching. When both learn, these 
two opposing effects are both present. In our benchmark case, these two effects 
roughly cancel one another and the average time of the market does not react 
much to the reform.  
3.4 Sensitivity and discussion 
In this section we study the how changes in the parameter values chosen affect 
the results shown in Table 1. We report the effect of the reform on the price level 
and time on the market in three alternatives cases. In all cases, we change one 
parameter value at the time while keeping others fixed at their benchmark level. 
The three parameters of interest are mean valuation of house type 1, the variance 
of the valuation distributions, and the initial mistake of the seller. 
Table 2 is related to case where the degree to which the two house types differ 
(as represented by the difference in the mean of the valuation distributions) 
varies. The table shows that the degree to which the two house types differ has 
virtually no impact on the time on the market before and after the reform. 
However, a bigger difference in the means implies that price level reacts more to 
the reform. 
Table 2.  Effects of the reform when the difference of the house types varies 
(benchmark μ1=1,041). 
Change in 
price level, % Before After
Sellers learn 1,4 7,9 9,2
Buyers learn 1,3 7,9 6,7
Both learn 2,4 7,9 7,9
Change in 
price level, % Before After
Sellers learn 0,5 8,1 9,3
Buyers learn 1,1 8,1 7,1
Both learn 1,4 8,1 8,1
Time on the market, weeks
Large difference in means (μ1=1,061)
Small difference in means (μ1=1,021)
Time on the market, weeks
 
 
Table 3 shows the results in cases where dispersion in the buyers’ valuations 
changes. The results indicate that changes in the variance of the valuation 
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distributions do not have much impact on how the reform affects price level. 
However, a bigger variance leads to longer time on the market both before and 
after the reform. 
Table 3.  Effects of the reform when variance of the valuation distributions 
varies (benchmark σ2=0,0011). 
Change in 
price level, % Before After
Sellers learn 1 8,3 9,9
Buyers learn 1,3 8,3 7,1
Both learn 2 8,3 8,4
Change in 
price level, % Before After
Sellers learn 1 7,3 8,6
Buyers learn 1,2 7,3 6,3
Both learn 1,9 7,3 7,4
Large variance (σ2=0,0013)
Small variance (σ2=0,0009)
Time on the market, weeks
Time on the market, weeks
 
 
Finally, Table 4 shows that small changes in the initial mistake of the sellers are 
not important for the effects of the reform.  
Table 4.  Effects of the reform when the initial mistake varies (benchmark 
0,46). 
Change in 
price level, % Before After
Sellers learn 1,1 7,9 9,3
Buyers learn 1,3 7,9 6,8
Both learn 2,1 7,9 7,9
Change in 
price level, % Before After
Sellers learn 1 7,7 9,3
Buyers learn 1,2 7,7 6,6
Both learn 1,9 7,7 7,9
Large initial mistake (0,56)
Time on the market, weeks
Small initial mistake (0,36)
Time on the market, weeks
 
 
All in all, the results in Tables 2, 3 and 4 indicate that our findings are quite 
robust to changes in parameter values. In particular, the tables show that 
increased price information leads to a higher price level but may lead to shorter 
or longer time on the market depending on whether the sellers or the buyers react 
more to the reform. 
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It is interesting to note that there are several papers focusing on the potential 
effects of frictions in the housing market on housing market outcomes in a 
matching framework (see e.g. Wheaton, 1990 or Carrillo, 2012). Often these 
frictions are assumed to be related to incomplete information. Our analysis 
indicates that it may be misleading to assume that the effects of an information 
shock manifest themselves simply as more efficient matching. More detailed 
information about the market conditions can change the expectations of the 
traders in a manner that can overturn the potential effect on matching frictions.   
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4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Data 
We use data on individual transactions provided by the Technical Research 
Centre of Finland (VTT). The VTT data are based on the same underlying data 
from the Real Estate Agents’ Association as the website but covers the whole 
country and includes more detailed housing characteristics. The data exist from 
1982 until June 2011 but we use data from 2003 onwards because of 
inconsistencies in key housing characteristics variables.  
We have four years of data from the post-treatment period (July 2007 to June 
2011). In order to facilitate the comparability of the post- and pre-treatment 
periods we use an equally long sample form the pre-treatment period (July 2003 
to June 2007). In our main estimation, we employ a sample which covers 
apartment blocks in Helsinki area within 5 kilometers of the boundary of the area 
covered by the website. Sample construction is discussed in more detail in 
Section 4.2.1. Table 5 provides summary statistics for the sample used in the 
estimation. The choice of the width of the bands around the treatment area 
boundary and the length of the time period are, of course, somewhat arbitrary. 
We test for the robustness of our findings to different alternatives to these 
choices when discussing the results. 
The outcome variables used in the empirical analysis are sale price and time on 
the market. Price is defined as the transaction price to which we add the 
apartment’s share of possible debt held by the housing company. Average price 
is 114,000 euros. Time to sale is calculated as the difference between the listing 
date and the date of sale. Average time on the market is 55 days. Dwelling 
characteristics are used as control variables. The design and spaciousness of the 
dwelling is captured by floor area and the number of rooms (bed rooms and 
living rooms). We allow for a non-linear effect of the age of the house by 
including a dummy variable for newly built houses and the age of the house and 
its square. Dummies for good and bad condition measure the quality of the 
apartment. The excluded category is satisfactory condition. We also include a 
dummy for a vacant unit and monthly maintenance charge.  
Unfortunately, the data do not contain information about listing prices or possible 
revisions of listing prices and rejected offers. Nor do they include any 
information about the seller or the buyer. This means that we cannot study the 
potential effect of listing price on market outcome as in Merlo and Ortalo-Magné 
(2004). Nor can we analyze the effect of the reform on the distribution of listing 
prices. 
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The data include the address of the house, which allows us to geo-locate most 
transactions in Helsinki area. We use the coordinates of the addresses to calculate 
the distance to the closest address on the other side of the boundary in which 
transactions took place in the period of our analysis. We refer to this measure of 
distance as distance to the treatment area boundary, even though it is strictly 
speaking not based on the distance to the boundary. Distance to transactions is a 
more relevant measure of distance for our purposes than distance to the 
boundary.16 
Table 5.  Summary statistics. 
  Mean Std. Dev.
Price (€ 1,000’s) 114.3 42.6
Time to sale (days) 55.2 54.5
Treatment area 0.43 0.50
Treatment time 0.54 0.50
Rooms 2.28 0.83
Floor area (m2) 59.62 17.05
New (1/0) 0.066 0.25
Good condition (1/0) 0.61 0.49
Bad condition (1/0) 0.02 0.13
Vacant (1/0) 0.96 0.19
Age 25.65 13.60
Maintenance charge (€/m2) 2.87 0.82
 
4.2 Empirical strategy 
In this section, we explain the methods we use in the estimations. We test for the 
effect of increased price information on house prices and time on the market. The 
effect on sale price is modeled through a standard linear regression model. The 
effect on sales times is estimated using duration models. In both cases, we will 
exploit the feature of the reform that it only covered certain municipalities and 
therefore increased information related to transactions in certain geographical 
areas only. 
4.2.1 Treatment and control groups 
The nature of the policy experiment fits very well to Differences in Differences 
(DiD) estimation. For instance, we essentially do not have to worry about 
anticipation effects. In addition, the fact that the website covers only part of the 
country and excludes single family homes offers several possibilities. Firstly, we 
could use some or all of the 13 cities covered by the website as the treatment 
                                              
16 Moreover, there were inaccuracies in the GIS municipality boundary files available to us. 
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group and the excluded cities as the control group. Secondly, single family units 
could be used as a control group for apartment blocks and row houses in the 
treated areas. Thirdly, we could compare the difference in prices and sale times 
of single family units and other units in the treated and control areas through 
triple differencing. However, exploring the data suggested that the prices and sale 
times evolved very differently in different cities. This is not surprising as the 
developments in each housing market area depend on the interplay between local 
demand and supply conditions. There are large differences across cities in the 
developments of the relative prices and sale times of single family units and other 
units as well, which seemed to invalidate the triple differencing approach using 
house type as an additional margin of differencing.  
The identifying assumption behind DiD estimation is that in the absence of the 
treatment the outcome variable (conditional on the control variables) would 
evolve similarly in the treatment and control groups. Hence, ensuring that the 
treatment group and the control group are comparable is crucial for reliable 
estimation. We argue that our best hope of obtaining reliable estimates of the 
impact of increased information with the available data is to focus on the market 
for flats in apartment blocks in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area (HMA). The 
website covered four core municipalities (Helsinki, Espoo, Kauniainen and 
Vantaa) of the Helsinki Metropolitan Area and the rest of the area was excluded. 
The semi-urban area reaches beyond the core municipalities and we have 
reasonably dense data on transactions inside and outside the area covered by the 
website. This allows us to further facilitate the comparability of the treatment and 
control groups by limiting the estimating sample to 5 kilometer bands just inside 
and just outside the boundary of the treatment area. The underlying demand and 
supply conditions are likely to develop very similarly on either side of the 
treatment area boundary within these narrow bands. A similar strategy has been 
used in a housing market context by Dachis et al. (2011) who study the effect of 
real estate transfer taxes on the number of house sales and house prices.17 Figure 
3 shows municipalities in the Helsinki area. Municipalities covered by the 
website are indicated with gray. 
We drop from the data flats that were on the market when the website was 
opened. This ensures that the whole bidding process of transactions in the 
treatment group was affected by the increased information. Listing prices of flats 
that were on the market when the website was opened were set before the reform. 
Assuming that these flats are part of the treatment group could bias our results.  
                                              
17 Dachis et al. (2011) utilize the introduction of the real estate transfer tax in Toronto as the source of 
temporal variation in taxes and limit the sample to a 5km bands around the municipality boundary.  
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Figure 3.  Municipalities in the sample area. 
 
Table 6.  Averages by treatment area before and after treatment. 
  Treatment area Control area 
  
Pre-
treatment 
Post-
treatment 
Pre-
treatment 
Post-
treatment 
Price (€ 1,000’s) 101.0 124.6 103.2 124.6 
Time to sale (days) 63.3 53.0 58.6 48.7 
Rooms 2.24 2.28 2.26 2.31 
Floor area (m2) 59.50 59.94 59.22 59.80 
New (1/0) 0.088 0.023 0.126 0.030 
Good condition (1/0) 0.639 0.590 0.560 0.671 
Bad condition (1/0) 0.017 0.016 0.012 0.023 
Vacant (1/0) 0.964 0.958 0.978 0.955 
Age 23.58 26.54 24.69 27.15 
Maintenance charge 
(€/m2) 2.77 3.19 2.56 2.95 
N 822 1128 1260 1280 
 
Table 6 shows average price, sale time and dwelling characteristics in the 
treatment and control groups before and after the opening of the website in July 
2007. Pre-treatment averages are reassuringly similar in the treatment and control 
areas. In both areas mean house price was slightly over 100,000 euros in the pre-
treatment period and average time on the market was around 60 days. In the post-
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treatment period prices were about 20% higher and sale times were shorter than 
before the treatment. Most dwelling characteristics are stable over time or 
develop very similarly in the treatment and control areas. However, the share of 
flats in good condition decreases in the treatment area from 64% to 59% and 
increases in the control area from 56% to 67%. This suggests that controlling for 
dwelling characteristics is important. 
4.2.2 Housing prices 
Our empirical strategy is based on the comparison of housing transactions with 
similar structural characteristics on different sides of the treatment area boundary 
before and after the treatment took place. Our base model uses the DiD approach 
in a standard linear regression model  
t 1 2 3 4 _  _ ( _ * _ )   it it i it i i p itY Treat time Treat area Treat time Treat area X µ uβ β β β β= + + + + + +
      (6) 
where Yit is the (log of) sale price of unit i in time t. Dummy Treat_time gets 
value one if the transaction took place after the website was opened in 1 July 
2007 and zero otherwise. Dummy Treat_area indicates transactions in the 
treatment area. The interaction of the treatment time and treatment area indicators 
marks the transactions in the treatment area after 1 July 2007. The parameter of 
interest is β3 which gives the average effect of the treatment on Y. The identifying 
assumption under which β3 has a causal interpretation is that 
Treat_timeit*Treat_areait is uncorrelated with the error term uit. We believe that 
this assumption is likely to hold when we include a detailed set of control 
variables in the model. Vector X includes a detailed set of housing attributes. 
Transactions are grouped quarterly and we include quarter fixed effects to control 
for shocks that affect both the treatment and control areas. In addition, we 
include postcode fixed effects µip to control for area characteristics that do not 
change over time. Standard errors are clustered at the postcode level (21 clusters) 
to account for serial correlation in the error term within postcode.18 
4.2.3 Time on the market 
A linear DiD model may not be appropriate when the response variable comes in 
the form of a duration. Crucially, for our purposes, OLS cannot accommodate 
explanatory variables that change value over time. Therefore, we model the 
effect of price information on sales times through a Cox’s proportional hazard 
model with time varying covariates discussed by Wooldridge (2002), among 
others. The model is written as 
                                              
18 Simulations in Bertrand et al. (2004) indicate that cluster robust inference works reasonably well when 
the number of clusters is reasonably large. In their simulation, with 20 clusters the rejection rate of a true 
null hypothesis of no effect is 5.8% at the 5% significance level. 
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( )
( ) ( )( )0 1 2 3 4
    |     
exp  _  _  _ * _  t it i it i i p
Pr Sold at duration d not sold before d
h d Treat time Treat area Treat time Treat area X µβ β β β β= + + + + +
      
(7) 
where the hazard rate of a unit getting sold at duration d conditional on being on 
the market until d is a function of the baseline hazard h0(d) and the exponential 
function of other determinants of sales time. In order to introduce time varying 
covariates (Treat_time and quarter dummies), we split the spells by quarter. We 
use the Cox (1972) partial maximum likelihood estimator for the β parameters 
that does not require estimating h0(d). The semi-parametric proportional hazard 
model allows us to study how the opening of the website shifted the hazard 
function without restrictive distributional assumptions. The coefficients are 
approximate semi-elasticities of the hazard rate with respect to the covariates. 
Again, we control for dwelling characteristics, postcode fixed effects and 
common quarterly shocks. Standard errors are clustered at the postcode level to 
account for serial correlation in the error term within area. 
4.2.4 Internal and external validity 
A potential caveat of DiD estimation using data across the treatment area 
boundary is that in addition to the channels identified in Section 3, our estimates 
may be affected by factors specific to the empirical set-up. On one hand, 
potential information spill-overs from the treatment area to the control area could 
work against finding an effect for increased information. On the other hand, 
increased information within the treatment area could affect entry to the market. 
In particular, the treatment could displace demand for housing from the control 
area to the treatment area. It could for example be that buying in areas with more 
detailed information is considered less risky, which could make the treated area 
more attractive. The displacement effect might bias the price effect estimates 
upwards and sale time estimates downwards. The possibility of cross-border 
effects implies that one should be cautious when generalizing the empirical 
findings to a situation where information increases in the whole housing market 
area. However, we think that the potential cross-border effects are likely to be of 
second order importance compared with the mechanisms found in Section 3.  
A further concern regarding the validity of our DiD strategy is that the treatment 
area boundary coincides with municipality borders. Place based government 
policies coinciding with the opening of the website could contaminate the results 
if they affect differently the treatment and control groups. We are not aware of 
significant policy changes that could be expected to capitalize into housing 
prices. We argue that changes in municipal taxes and services are not an 
important endogeneity issue. For example, the negative house price effect of an 
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increase in local taxes can be expected to be counteracted by improved services.19 
These potential issues notwithstanding, we argue that DiD estimation based on 
the comparison of similar flats on either side of the boundary provides a 
convincing test of the effect of increased information in the housing market.  
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Increased information and sale price 
Table 7 shows the results for price. The dependent variable is the log of sale 
price. The first column shows the simple DiD estimates when we only control for 
quarter fixed effects. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive but 
insignificant. In the second column, we add dwelling characteristics. In this case, 
the treatment effect estimate rises to 6% and becomes and significant at the 1% 
level. All the dwelling characteristics, except the dummy for new flats, are 
statistically significant and have expected signs: Price increases with the number 
of rooms and floor area. Good condition increases price by 7%, bad condition 
decreases price by 10% relative to satisfactory condition and vacant flats are 
about 3% more expensive. Age and price have a U-shaped relationship. 
Maintenance charge has a negative effect on price. In the third column, where we 
add postcode dummies (21 postcodes), the coefficient on the interaction term 
decreases to 4.4% but remains highly significant. Taken at face value, the 
coefficient implies that publishing information on past transactions led to a 4% 
increase in the average price. In the fourth column, we allow for different linear 
trends in the treatment and control areas. The treatment effect estimate reduces 
slightly to 3.4% and is still significant at the 5% level. The interaction term of 
quarter and Treat_area is 0.001 and the t-test supports the common trends 
assumption. Therefore, column (3) is our preferred specification. 
                                              
19 In the theoretical framework of local taxation and service provision developed in Brueckner (1979 and 
1982), the local government should set the level of public expenditures such that the capitalized tax 
needed to finance a further rise in services would just offset the capitalized willingness to pay for them. 
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Table 7.  Increased information and sale price. 
Dep. Var ln(price) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treat group -0.046 -0.034              
[0.070] [0.029]              
Treat time 0.043 0.060*** 0.044*** 0.034**  
* Treat group [0.025] [0.017] [0.010] [0.014]    
2 rooms 0.046* 0.057*** 0.057*** 
[0.024] [0.020] [0.020]    
3 rooms 0.129*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 
[0.041] [0.030] [0.030]    
4 rooms 0.211*** 0.229*** 0.228*** 
[0.048] [0.036] [0.036]    
5 rooms or more 0.388*** 0.352*** 0.352*** 
[0.046] [0.051] [0.052]    
Ln(floor space) 0.458*** 0.439*** 0.440*** 
[0.050] [0.033] [0.033]    
New 0.013 0.022 0.021 
[0.027] [0.019] [0.019]    
Good condition 0.066*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005]    
Bad condition -0.100*** -0.090*** -0.090*** 
[0.018] [0.013] [0.013]    
Vacant 0.026 0.029** 0.029**  
[0.015] [0.012] [0.012]    
Age -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002]    
Age2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    
Maintenance charge/m2 -0.016** -0.008** -0.008**  
[0.006] [0.003] [0.003]    
Quarter 0.015*** 
[0.001]    
Treat group 0.001 
*Quarter [0.001]    
Quarter fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Postcode fixed effects YES YES 
N 4490 4490 4490 4490 
R-squared 0.156 0.873 0.913 0.913 
Standard errors clustered at postcode level in brackets 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: main effect of Treat time absorbed by quarter dummies in (1)-(4) 
and main effect of Treat droup absorbed by postcode dummies in (3)-(4) 
 
 25 
 
Figure 4 shows the development of quarterly price difference between the 
treatment and control areas after controlling for dwelling characteristics. The line 
shows the coefficient on the treatment area dummy interacted with quarterly time 
dummies. The dashed line indicates the treatment period and the grey area is the 
95% percent confidence interval. Quarterly price differences are imprecisely 
estimated and volatile due to sampling error but there is, nevertheless, a clearly 
visible upward shift coinciding with the opening of the website. As suggested by 
the final specification of Table 7, where we control for different trends, there is 
no apparent trend in the price difference. The strong and persistent increase in the 
price difference when the website was opened increases the confidence in the 
reliability of the regression estimates in Table 7.  
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Figure 4.  Price difference between treatment and control areas. 
 
Our main estimates in Table 7 used an eight year window around the introduction 
of the website and 5km bands around the treatment area boundary. We next test 
the robustness of the results to these choices in Tables 8 and 9. 
Table 8 reports the treatment effect estimates with 2, 4, 6 year windows using 
otherwise the same specification as in the third column of Table 7. The estimates 
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vary between 3.2% and 4.8% and are statistically significant. Thus the choice of 
the time window does not affect our results on the price effect much.  
Table 8.  Increased information and sale price – robustness to time 
window. 
Dep. Var ln(price) 2 years 4 years 6 years 
Treat time* Treat group 0.032** 0.034*** 0.048*** 
[0.012] [0.012] [0.010] 
N 1158 1672 3330 
R-squared 0.91 0.907 0.909 
Controls: Quarter fixed effects, house characteristics and postcode fixed effects  
Standard errors clustered at postcode level in brackets 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Finally, Table 9 shows the results when we change the sample criteria regarding 
the distance to the treatment area boundary. The price effect estimate is 
consistently positive but seems to decrease as we expand the sample area further 
away from the boundary. With the 10km distance threshold, the estimate 
becomes insignificant. We argue that the specifications with narrower distance 
bands give more reliable results than the 10km band. The DiD assumption of 
similar price developments in the treatment and control group in the absence of 
the treatment is less likely to hold as we expand the sample area. The 5km 
distance threshold is our preferred specification because it gives a sufficient 
sample size for precise estimation while being narrow enough to ensure 
comparability.  
Table 9.  Increased information and sale price – robustness to distance 
threshold. 
Dep. Var ln(price) 2km 4km 6km 8km 10km 
Treat time* Treat group 0.050 0.052*** 0.031** 0.022* 0.013 
N.A.a [0.013] [0.015] [0.011] [0.010] 
N 837 2569 5131 7508 11695 
R-squared 0.91 0.927 0.908 0.909 0.893 
Controls: Quarter fixed effects, house characteristics and postcode fixed effects  
Standard errors clustered at postcode level in brackets
a
 Standard error not shown for the 2km band due to insufficient number of clusters 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Altogether, Tables 7–9 provide evidence that the opening of the website boosted 
housing prices. Our preferred estimate (column 3 of Table 7) suggests that the 
effect is around 4%. The magnitude should, however, be regarded as 
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approximate. Even if differential trends in the control and treatment areas are 
rejected by the significance test, controlling for differential trends reduces the 
point estimate. Moreover, the estimates are somewhat sensitive to the width of 
the distance band around the treatment area boundary and the width of the time 
window.  
4.3.2 Increased information and time on the market 
Table 10 reports the Cox proportional hazard model results for time on the 
market. Note that a positive coefficient indicates a higher probability of the flat 
being sold, conditional on not being sold before, which translates into a shorter 
time on the market. In the first column, without control variables, the coefficient 
on the interaction term is small and insignificant. However, adding housing 
attributes in the second column increases the coefficient to 0.23 and it becomes 
highly significant. The results do not change in the third column where we add 
postcode fixed effects. The coefficient increases slightly when we allow for 
different trends (fourth column) and the standard error increases. Again, the 
interaction of Treat_area and quarter is small and insignificant, which supports 
the common trends assumption.  
The estimates in our preferred specification (column 3) indicate a roughly 24% 
increase in the sale hazard in the treated area relative to the control area. Figure 5 
illustrates what this implies for sale times by showing the estimated survival 
function with and without the treatment when all other variables are set to their 
means. The treatment reduces the share of flats still on the market after 50 days 
from roughly 45% to around 35%. 
In Figure 6 we examine how the proportionate difference in sale hazard between 
the treatment and control areas evolves over time. Housing characteristics are 
controlled for. Dashed line indicates the treatment period and the area around the 
line is the 95% confidence interval. The line is somewhat volatile but, as in 
Figure 4, there is a visible upward shift in sale hazard when the website is 
opened.   
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Table 10.  Increased information and sale time. 
Cox proportional  
hazard estimates (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treat area -0.095 -0.266** 
[0.180] [0.105] 
Treat time 0.022 0.230*** 0.238*** 0.281**  
* Treat area [0.117] [0.073] [0.066] [0.136]    
2 rooms 0.150* 0.147* 0.148*   
[0.080] [0.079] [0.080]    
3 rooms 0.104 0.088 0.089 
[0.135] [0.138] [0.140]    
4 rooms 0.145 0.106 0.109 
[0.192] [0.200] [0.202]    
5 rooms or more 0.143 0.164 0.17 
[0.276] [0.272] [0.272]    
Ln(floor space) -0.768*** -0.727*** -0.729*** 
[0.186] [0.185] [0.188]    
New -1.202*** -1.225*** -1.225*** 
[0.145] [0.132] [0.131]    
Good condition 0.103*** 0.089*** 0.088*** 
[0.031] [0.032] [0.032]    
Bad condition 0.199*** 0.229*** 0.229*** 
[0.069] [0.073] [0.073]    
Vacant 0.478*** 0.432*** 0.431*** 
[0.126] [0.130] [0.128]    
Age 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
[0.008] [0.007] [0.007]    
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    
Maintenance charge/m2 -0.119*** -0.114*** -0.115*** 
[0.021] [0.022] [0.022]    
Quarter 0.209**  
[0.083]    
Treat area -0.003 
*Quarter       [0.008]    
Quarter fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Postcode fixed effects YES YES 
N 4437 4437 4437 4437 
Log-likelihood -32693 -32317 -32272 -32272 
Standard errors clustered at postcode level in brackets 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Note: main effect of Treat time absorbed by quarter dummies in (1)-(4) 
and main effect of Treat area absorbed by postcode dummies in (3)-(4) 
 29 
 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Sh
ar
e 
no
t s
ol
d
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
Time on the market
Treatment Control
 
Figure 5.  Survival functions after the reform in treatment and control 
areas. 
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Figure 6.  Proportionate difference in sale hazard between treatment and 
control areas. 
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We next consider the same robustness tests as above in the estimation of price 
effects while retaining otherwise the specification as in the third column of Table 
10. Table 11 shows the results for varying time windows. The estimates are 
similar to the results with an 8-year window in Table 10. All coefficients are 
positive and significant and the magnitude varies around the 0.24 estimate 
obtained in Table 10 using an 8-year window.       
Table 11.  Increased information and sale time – robustness to time window. 
Cox proportional  
hazard estimates 2 years 4 years 6 years 
Treat time* Treat group 0.342*** 0.240*** 0.183** 
[0.104] [0.068] [0.077] 
N 1282 2299 3449 
Log-likelihood -7216 -14694 -23541 
Controls: Quarter fixed effects, house characteristics and postcode fixed effects  
Standard errors clustered at postcode level in brackets 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 12 shows the results for alternative distance thresholds. The estimates are 
consistently positive and significant implying that better information on past 
transactions led to a shorter time on the market. The time on the market estimates 
are less sensitive to the distance band used than the price effect estimates. 
Table 12.  Increased information and sale time – robustness to distance 
threshold. 
Cox proportional  
hazard estimates 2km 4km 6km 8km 10km 
Treat time* Treat group 0.229 0.287*** 0.206*** 0.150*** 0.167*** 
N.A. a [0.077] [0.066] [0.057] [0.042]    
N 836 2548 5079 7328 11457 
Log-likelihood -4681 -17118 -37670 -57027 -94281 
Controls: Quarter fixed effects, house characteristics and postcode fixed effects  
Standard errors clustered at postcode level in brackets
a
 Standard error not shown for the 2km band due to insufficient number of clusters 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
All in all, Tables 11 and 12 indicate that our results on the sale times are not very 
sensitive to changes in the time period nor the geographic area analyzed. The 
results show that the opening of the website led to a significant decrease in the 
time on the market. 
 31 
 
5. Discussion 
The discussion in Section 3 shows that when price information is increased in the 
market, there are several potential channels through which the behavior of 
individual traders and, as a result, market outcomes could be affected. 
Concerning the effect on prices, the prediction is clear: regardless of who reacts 
to the new information, average price in the market is expected to increase after 
the reform. This is indeed what happens after the Finnish reform: we find clear 
evidence that prices increased in the treatment area when detailed information 
became available.  
Regarding the sale time, the prediction of Section 3 is much less clear cut. When 
sellers obtain new information, they, on average, set higher prices. This would, 
other things equal, lead to longer time on the market. However, if the new 
information helps buyers self select to visit the right houses, the matching 
process in the market becomes more efficient. This in turn would, other things 
equal, lead to faster sales. These two opposing effects may well cancel one 
another. Our empirical results show that the time on the market becomes shorter 
after the reform. The empirical evidence therefore suggests that buyers react 
more to the new information than the sellers. 
We aimed to keep our modeling framework simple so as to focus on the role of 
information. One potentially important missing ingredient in the model is the role 
of real estate agents. As mentioned above, the data we use contain trades 
completed by real estate agents. Unfortunately, the data do not contain 
information about the identity of the real estate agent which rules out more 
detailed study of the potential behavioral responses by the real estate agents.  
One possible explanation for why buyers react more to new information than 
sellers could be that sellers who use real estate agents are less likely to search for 
new information or to have full control over the price setting. If the decisions on 
listing prices are much affected by the agents, we would most likely observe less 
reaction in the behavior of the sellers than in the behavior of the buyers. Indeed, 
there is evidence suggesting that real estate agents do not necessarily use their 
information advantage in the best interest of their clients. For instance, Levitt and 
Syverson (2008) find that homes owned by real estate agents sell at higher prices 
and stay longer on the market than other comparable houses. In addition, greater 
information asymmetry, measured by the heterogeneity of the housing stock, 
seems to lead to higher distortions.20 
                                              
20 Rutherford et al. (2005) also find that real estate agents earn higher selling prices on their own homes. 
Their focus is on the effort exerted by the agent. Hendel et al. (2009) compare the performance of two 
competing platforms: an established platform offering a bundle of services available from real estate 
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6. Conclusions 
We analyze the implications of a reform which increases the publicly available 
price information in the housing market. Housing market is characterized by 
experimentation and price bargaining between a potential seller and a buyer. In 
such an environment sellers and buyers are likely to use their own experience in 
the market so as to update their beliefs about the market conditions. More 
detailed price information may complement this learning process. 
Our theoretical analysis focuses on the different channels through which public 
information may affect market outcomes. The prediction of the model is that 
increased price information unambiguously leads to higher prices. The effect of 
increased price information on time on the market is less clear. This is because 
the behavioral responses of the sellers and the buyers are likely to influence the 
time on the market to opposing directions and the total effect depends on which 
channel dominates. 
Our empirical analysis uses Finnish data to study how the opening of a website 
with detailed information on past transactions affected housing prices and sales 
times. Our empirical strategy is based on the comparison of transactions in the 
same housing market area on either side of the boundary of the area covered by 
the website. The empirical results show that increased information had a positive 
effect on price and a negative effect on time on the market.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
agents and a newly established no-service platform. They find no support for the hypothesis that listing 
the house on the platform offering real estate agent services delivers a higher sale price. 
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